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DIRECTOR of CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Key Intelligence Questions
For
Fiscal Year 1974

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4 January 1974
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
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Key Intelligence Questions for FY 1974

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KEY INTELLIGENCE QUESTIONS
FOR FY 1974

INTRODUCTION

1. The attached compilation of Key Intelligence Questions for Fiscal Year 1974 is issued as guidance to the Intelligence Community for the collection and production of intelligence on subjects of major importance to national-level intelligence consumers.

2. Two additional categories of intelligence collection and production, not included in this priority national intelligence guidance, are:

a. Lower priority national intelligence subjects: These are deliberately omitted in order to highlight the priority which attaches to the Key Intelligence Questions. It is recognized that some attention must be devoted to lower priority subjects (e.g., developments in Africa), although such subjects should, to the extent possible, require less expensive and less difficult collection techniques. The relative priorities of the broad spectrum of intelligence topics are reflected in the comprehensive listing of U.S. foreign intelligence topics in the Attachment to DCID 1/2 currently being considered by the USIB.

b. Departmental and tactical intelligence (including the intelligence requirements of the operational commanders, certain warning and surveillance activities, etc.): It is clear that some appropriate portion of the national intelligence effort must be devoted to meeting these needs, and the National Foreign Intelligence Budget Recommendations take account of this fact. Continuing efforts will be made to improve the interaction and mutual support of national and tactical programs so that each may be served by the same activities to the maximum extent possible.

3. The attached Key Intelligence Questions are circulated for the following purposes:

First, to insure that these subjects are given priority in the regular collection and production activities of appropriate elements of the Intelligence Community.

Second, to enable preparation of a baseline review (as soon as feasible for FY 1974, but normally at the beginning of the fiscal year). This review will, in summary form, identify the

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status of current knowledge on the subject of each Key Intelligence Question, identify the important gaps, and the collection and production activities needed to fill the gaps. Its principal feature will be the acceptance of responsibility by appropriate individual intelligence agencies of the obligation to collect or produce on individual Key Intelligence Questions.

Third, to provide the basis for a recapitulation and evaluation, after the close of the fiscal year, of the performance of the Intelligence Community and of individual agencies on each of the Key Intelligence Questions.

Fourth, to enable experience with the Key Intelligence Questions process in the balance of FY 1974 to be used in preparation of questions for Community use in FY 1975.

And fifth, to permit the use of conclusions drawn from the recapitulation and evaluation of the FY 1974 effort as factors in Community resource allocations, specifically including the preparation of the DCI's National Foreign Intelligence Budget Recommendations to the President in November 1974.

4. While the attached Key Intelligence Questions are issued for guidance during the balance of FY 1974, it is clear that a full response to some of the questions cannot be expected within this time frame. It should be possible, however, to measure and evaluate to a degree the extent of progress within the period remaining in the current fiscal year.

5. The considerations cited in the introductions to the individual geographic and topical sets of Key Intelligence Questions provide guidance for longer-term forward planning for collection and production, particularly for subjects involving RDT&E and associated long lead times.

6. No priority is implied by the order of listing of the various Key Intelligence Questions. Difference in priorities exists, but it is not considered that refinements in levels of priority are necessary for the Key Intelligence Questions effort.

7. The attached Key Intelligence Questions are subject to additions or modifications during FY 1974 if such are required by major changes in the international situation or in the foreign intelligence environment.

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
SOVIET UNION/EASTERN EUROPE

The Soviet Union is the primary target of US intelligence efforts and can be expected to remain so because Soviet intentions and actions can so directly relate to the basic elements of US national security and to achievement of US foreign and economic policy objectives. With or without a viable detente, intelligence on the USSR will remain of continuing highest priority in the coming years.

In both the near and long term, improvement in the capabilities of Soviet strategic and conventional forces is a matter of major concern to the United States. Inherent in this problem is the monitoring of Soviet compliance with SAL and MBFR agreements. This involves detailed coverage of weapons systems capabilities and close attention to the early phases of Soviet military RDT&E relating to strategic offensive and defensive weapons systems.

Soviet political, economic and military contacts with the rest of the world are increasing the variety of topics on which high quality US intelligence is required. This puts a continuing priority on the need for intelligence, not only on Soviet military capabilities, but also on the dynamics of the Soviet political power structure, on factors influencing the Soviet leadership, on Soviet perceptions of the United States, and on the basic objectives of the USSR both at home and abroad.

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
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SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

Actions and reactions between the USSR and the PRC could have such an important impact on US interests worldwide that particular intelligence effort needs to be directed to obtaining an awareness and understanding of what is going on between these two countries. The serious border dispute is long-standing and still seems far from solution, with a resultant threat of hostilities which calls for continuing intelligence attention.

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
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THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

Recent improvements in the military capabilities of the PRC and the country's more outward-looking political stance have markedly increased the extent to which China's policies and actions can affect US security and policy interests. Both Mao's age and indications of considerable in-fighting among members of the governing elite make the character of the post-Mao leadership a matter of considerable importance.

The Chinese may already have achieved an effective nuclear deterrent against the USSR and they are working toward a nuclear capability against the United States. The evolving PRC nuclear forces could result in major qualitative changes in China's strategic relationship with the Third World as well as with the two superpowers. The situation calls for close and continuing attention to PRC military capabilities, particularly its nuclear delivery systems.

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
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MIDDLE EAST AND MOSLEM WORLD

Current US interest in the Middle East and Moslem world focuses on obtaining an Arab-Israeli peace and restoring the flow of oil to non-communist countries. For both the short and longer term, achievement of political and military stability in the area is of high priority importance to the United States. This means there must be continuing attention by US intelligence to information needed to support US efforts to assure continuing access to oil supplies, to increase US influence with the Arab states and to reduce vulnerabilities of the Moslem countries to Soviet and other anti-US influences. (See Economic 25X1X2n for questions related to oil.)



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
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SOUTHEAST ASIA

Ongoing or threatened insurgencies adverse to US interests in all Southeast Asia countries are, and probably will continue to be, the major focus of US intelligence in this area of the world. The situation is in flux throughout Southeast Asia and some level of armed hostilities with anti-US overtones can be expected to continue through-
29X1X2 least the next several years.



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
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LATIN AMERICA

Improvement of US understanding of Latin American political dynamics and their impact on US objectives in the Western Hemisphere is of sufficient importance at policy levels of the US Government to call for careful intelligence attention. The emergence of increasingly nationalistic, highly personal governments which exhibit anti-US tendencies is the primary force working against US interests. Obtaining and analyzing the information needed to cope with this situation will require a continuing intelligence effort.

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
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ECONOMICS

Intelligence on economic developments affecting US national security and on the plans, policies and economic performance of major US economic competitors is rapidly increasing in importance to government policy makers. The acquisition and analysis of foreign economic information has become, and is expected to remain, a high priority task of US intelligence.

25X6A

US dependence on the mineral resources of other countries, especially petroleum, is mounting. Incomes of oil-producing states are rising at an accelerated pace and some of these countries are exerting pressure on the United States and other countries by controlling oil supplies. The world demand for US grains and oilseeds has expanded. The Soviet Union is attempting to make up for deficiencies in its economy, and in so doing is seeking increased economic exchanges with the United States and other high-technology countries. Acquiring data on natural resource availability worldwide and on foreign technological developments of economic importance are expected to be tasks for the US intelligence community of increasing importance in the coming years.



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
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GENERAL, WORLDWIDE

Some important problems for which intelligence inputs are required at policy levels of the government are either worldwide in scope or involve a number of countries in different areas of the world. Rather than repeat the Key Intelligence Questions for each country to which they apply, four questions of this nature are grouped in this section.

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